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ESSAYS
COURTING DELIBERATION: AN ESSAY ON
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAN
JUDICIAL SYSTEM
MAYA SEN*
Many legal theorists and political philosophers—among them
John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Amy Gutmann, Dennis Thompson,
and Joshua Cohen—believe that decision making through delibera-
tion is a normative ideal that yields both better laws as well as a
positive transformation in its participants.  They further have
assumed the judiciary is perhaps best equipped to realize this kind
of “deliberative democracy,” and that the courts can effectively pro-
vide an example for other, less deliberative branches of government
to follow.  This Essay argues, however, that judicial deliberation is
both more complicated than is assumed by these theorists and also
embodies a kind of deliberation different in nature than the one we
would expect in a deliberative model.  Indeed, contributions from
social science suggest that judges are strategic (and oftentimes
political) actors, and that their “deliberations” are more akin to
bargaining than reasoned exchanges.  In addition, the products of
judicial decision making—the courts’ opinions—often fail to
reflect true deliberative reasoning.  Thus, the judiciary might in
many ways be less deliberative than its sister branches. This is not
to say that judicial processes cannot be modified to become more
deliberative—and therefore more normatively desirable—but it
does suggest that the assumption that the courts provide a delibera-
tive model for other decision makers to follow might be based on a
romanticized view of judicial processes, rather than on the way
judges actually behave.  This conclusion has, moreover, strong
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implications for the feasibility of deliberation as a decision-making
mechanism.
INTRODUCTION
Life at the U.S. Supreme Court has always had an air of intel-
lectual debate and rigor.  Contemporary portrayals of the Court
conjure images of feisty oral arguments, complete with nimble
lawyering, lively debate, and vigorous discussions between Jus-
tices and litigants.  Historians and biographers have only pro-
vided us with glimpses, but these discussions appear to continue
once public attention has subsided.  Indeed, Justices’ private
papers and memoirs have left us with romantic reflections of
what might be happening behind chambers doors—hours of
debate and dialogue, followed by copious letter writing and opin-
ion drafting as the Justices grapple with the deepest moral and
legal issues of their times.
These images of honest deliberation and of intellectual
exchange have prompted some political philosophers and legal
theorists to cite the judiciary as an example for other branches to
follow. These theorists—among them John Rawls, Ronald Dwor-
kin, Amy Gutmann, Dennis Thompson, and Joshua Cohen—con-
tend that deliberation is a desirable attribute and that decision
making through deliberation is a normative ideal that yields both
better laws as well as a positive transformation in its participants.
They further have assumed the judiciary is best equipped to real-
ize a deliberative ideal, and that it can provide an example for
less deliberative branches of government to follow.1
This Essay will argue, however, that judicial deliberation is
both more complicated than is assumed by these theorists and
also embodies a kind of deliberation different in nature than the
one we would expect in a deliberative model.  Indeed, contribu-
tions both from social sciences and from doctrinal scholarship
suggest that judges are strategic (and oftentimes political) actors,
and that their “deliberations” might be more similar to quid pro
quo bargaining than to reasoned intellectual exchanges.  Even
when courts do address issues of moral importance in a straight-
forward manner—for example, in cases involving constitutionally
protected rights—their standards of deliberation often fall short.
1. See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISA-
GREEMENT 45 (1996) (“Many constitutional democrats focus on the importance
of extensive moral deliberation within one of our democratic institutions—the
Supreme Court.  They argue that judges cannot interpret constitutional princi-
ples without engaging in deliberation, not least for the purpose of constructing
a coherent view out of the many moral values that our constitutional tradition
expresses.”).
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This is not to say that judicial processes cannot be modified to
become more deliberative, but it does suggest that the structure
and composition of the courts present serious institutional
impediments to deliberative democracy.  This conclusion has,
moreover, strong implications for the feasibility of deliberative
democracy as a practical concept, rather than as a normative
ideal.
Parts I and II of this Essay will begin by exploring the con-
cept of deliberative democracy, and examine along the way the
reasons why many legal and political theorists believe that the
courts—the Supreme Court in particular2—are the most deliber-
ative of governmental bodies.  Part III will examine why these
arguments might be flawed.  It will both highlight the ways in
which the judiciary’s protocol forecloses true deliberation and
will also examine the nature and content of selected Supreme
Court opinions through a deliberative lens.  Part IV will conclude
by noting the implications of the argument for deliberative
democracy.
I. THE IDEA OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
A brief sketch of what deliberative democracy is, and is not,
is a useful starting point and provides context for the rest of this
Essay.  The idea is quite simple.  Deliberative democracy revolves
around “questions of collective political will—about what should
be done.  It is about arriving at views that represent collective,
informed consent.”3  At the heart of deliberative democracy is
the idea that when free and equal people come together and dis-
cuss important decisions jointly—justifying their reasons publicly
on the basis of generally understood principles—then the result-
ing policy will be both better for society and better for the partici-
pants themselves.  Indeed, not simply a form of politics,
democracy, on the deliberative view, is a framework of social and
institutional conditions that facilitates free discussion among
equal citizens—by providing favorable conditions for participa-
tion, association, and expression.4  To this extent, “the idea that
democracy revolves around the transformation rather than sim-
2. This Essay focuses (as most legal theorists and political philosophers
do) on the Supreme Court, but these arguments apply with equal force to many
other federal and state courts.
3. JAMES S. FISHKIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY &
PUBLIC CONSULTATION 34 (2009).
4. See Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
185, 186 (Jon Elster ed., 1998).
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ply the aggregation of preferences has become one of the major
positions in democratic theory.”5
While the concept is simple and intuitive, there is no univer-
sally agreed-upon single definition of deliberative democracy.
Three broad principles undergird the concept.6  The first attri-
bute of a deliberative democracy is the importance of public
incorporation into the decision-making process.  A democracy
grounded in deliberation requires that “[p]ersons should be
treated not merely as objects of legislation, as passive subjects to
be ruled, but as autonomous agents who take part in the govern-
ance of their own society, directly or through their representa-
tives.”7  Consider the judiciary.  For courts to fully embrace
deliberative democracy (as many theorists believe they do), then
actions and decisions must demonstrate respect for members of
the public, and their opinions must be justified to all.  Those who
are bound by court decisions should not feel like subjects ruled
by an inaccessible system; to the contrary, they should feel that
they themselves are part of the process that led to the binding
decision.  Ultimately, “[a]ll [theorists] agree . . . that the notion
[of deliberative democracy] includes collective decision making
with the participation of all who will be affected by the decision
or their representatives: this is the democratic part.”8
A second guiding principle concerns the nature of the delib-
eration itself.  In a truly deliberative regime, the participants
must be on equal footing so that all voices can be heard.9  The
same participants must also “be open to the facts, arguments,
and proposals that come to their attention and must share a gen-
eral willingness to learn from their colleagues and others.”10
Those engaging in deliberation, in other words, must not possess
fixed, inalienable preferences; they cannot be unwilling to
5. Jon Elster, Introduction, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 4, at 1,
1.
6. For more on what constitutes a deliberative democracy see AMY GUT-
MANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 3–8 (2004).
7. Id. at 3.
8. Elster, supra note 5, at 1, 8.
9. See Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in CONTEMPO-
RARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN ANTHOLOGY 143, 162 (Robert E. Goodin &
Philip Pettit eds., 2006) (“In ideal deliberation parties are both formally and
substantively equal.  They are formally equal in that the rules regulating the
procedure do not single out individuals.  Everyone with the deliberative capaci-
ties has equal standing at each stage of the deliberative process.  Each can put
issues on the agenda, propose solutions, and offer reasons in support of or in
criticism of proposals.”).
10. JOSEPH BESSETTEE, THE Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy
and American National Government 46 (1994).
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change their viewpoints, and their relative positions cannot be so
disparate that competing voices are drowned out.  To the con-
trary, those embarking on a deliberative enterprise must be will-
ing to consider seriously opposing viewpoints and to incorporate
those viewpoints into their worldview.  Deliberative democracy at
its core “requires that participants sincerely weigh the issues on
their merits.”11
The third most important principle is that decision makers
provide reasoned justifications.  As noted by Elster,
“[d]eliberative democracy rests on argumentation, not only in
the sense that it proceeds by argument, but also in the sense that
it must be justified by argument.”12  To fulfill this promise, justifi-
cations must be both procedurally and substantively “accessible.”
Justifications and reasons provided by the decision makers must
therefore be made public, and reasoning must not take place
exclusively in the “privacy of one’s mind.”13  Deliberative democ-
racy values transparency and regimes that obfuscate or engage in
secretive deliberations behind closed doors would stand squarely
in contrast.  “Substantive accessibility” is perhaps more elusive—
but equally as (if not more) important.  As Gutmann and
Thompson note, a “deliberative justification does not even get
started if those to whom it is addressed cannot understand its
essential content.”14  To this extent, the proffered explanation—
as well as the public record of the decision-making process—
should not be crouched in language that is impossible for the
general public to understand.  Also, most justifications must not
be based on technicalities or minutiae.
What are the benefits of such a democratic system?  Theo-
rists have cited multiple advantages,15 and they group roughly
into three general categories.  First, many believe that a delibera-
tive form of democratic decision making results in better laws
11. FISHKIN, supra note 3, at 35.
12. Elster, supra note 5, at 1, 9.
13. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 4.
14. Id.
15. Elster’s summary on point actually finds at least nine advantages:
[D]iscussion is (or can be) good because (or to the extent that) it
reveals private information, lessens or overcomes the impact of
bounded rationality, forces or induces a particular mode of justifying
demands, legitimizes the ultimate choice, is desirable for its own sake,
makes for Pareto-superior decisions, makes for better decisions in
terms of distributive justice, makes for a larger consensus, improves
the moral or intellectual qualities of the participants.
Elster, supra note 5, at 1, 11; see also James D. Fearon, Deliberation as Discussion, in
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 4, at 44, 43–44 (identifying six benefits to
deliberative democracy).
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and better political processes. Gutmann and Thompson, for
example, support the view that deliberation “promote[s] mutu-
ally respectful processes of decision-making”16 and that it
“help[s] correct the[ ] mistakes” that citizens make when they
take collective actions.17  Second, many believe that deliberation
can have a positive transformative impact on its participants.18  In
this regard, deliberation not only makes participants more
attuned to the viewpoints of others, but it also makes them more
aware about their own preferences—including the moral and
factual strengths and weaknesses of their positions.19  Along
these lines, deliberation—with its emphasis on collective discus-
sion and individual introspection—also encourages individuals
to recognize their civic potential as fully informed citizens.  Ack-
erman and Fishkin, for example, argue that the use of delibera-
tive forms of polling shows that “[o]rdinary men and women can
function successfully as citizens.”20
A third benefit is that deliberation confers a certain amount
of legitimacy upon the decision-making process.  If citizens
believe that a law was born out of genuine participation—guided
by reasoned deliberation—they will be more likely to accept it.
As Benhabib has argued, “legitimacy in complex democratic soci-
eties must be thought to result from the free and unconstrained
public deliberation of all about matters of common concern.”21
Accordingly, “a public sphere of deliberation about matters of
mutual concern is essential to the legitimacy of democratic insti-
tutions.”22  The legitimacy conferred by deliberation is particu-
larly important when resources are scarce and are to be divided
unequally.  “The hard choices that public officials have to make
16. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 11.
17. Id. at 11–12.
18. But see James D. Fearon, Deliberation as Discussion, in DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY, supra note 4, at 44, 59–60 (finding this argument “backhanded,” as
“[i]t would be strange to discuss matters purely for the sake of improving our-
selves morally and intellectually if we had no expectation that discussion would
have any positive effect on the quality of the collective choice”).
19. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 181
(2004) (“By airing competing arguments about [contested facts], deliberation
permits their reexamination—opening up the possibility of opinion change
after due reflection.”); GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 12 (arguing
that, when citizens “deliberate, they can expand their knowledge, including
both their self-understanding and their collective understanding of what will
best serve their fellow citizens”).
20. ACKERMAN & FISHKIN, supra note 19, at 5 (emphasis omitted).
21. Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in
DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 67,
68 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996).
22. Id.
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should be more acceptable, even to those who receive less than
they deserve, if everyone’s claims have been considered on the
merits, rather than on the basis of the party’s bargaining
power.”23
Frankly, not all of deliberative democracy’s backers agree on
its definition or on its benefits.  What they do agree on, however,
is what deliberative democracy is not.  Deliberative democracy is
not simply an aggregate model of democracy, or the kind that
operates by taking citizens’ preferences as fixed and then adding
them together in some fashion.24  Consider, for example, votes
in Congress.  This aggregative process takes members’ prefer-
ences as given and yields no reasoned justification at the end of
the decision-making process.  The public is rarely privy to the
back-room ruminations and communications that led to the deci-
sion, and seldom are nuances of the intellectual path to the con-
gressional vote provided (particularly for minor pieces of
legislation).  The end result is a decision-making process where
preferences “as such do not need to be justified” and little impor-
tance is placed on “the reasons that citizens or their representa-
tives give or fail to give.”25
Deliberative democracy can also be distinguished from quid
pro quo bargaining.  By one definition, such bargaining is akin to
“sequential ‘divide-a-dollar’ games in which the parties make suc-
cessive offers and counteroffers.”26 A decision made under this
form of bargaining “is determined by the bargaining mechanism
and the bargaining power of the parties—that is, the resources
that enable them to make credible threats and promises.”27  Gut-
mann and Thompson refer to this type of bargaining as “self-
interested” bargaining, and it can be thought of as the type of
bargaining that rational actors with fixed preferences play in the-
oretical game situations.  It is also to a large extent the type of
decision making that routinely happens both within Congress
and in the back and forth between Congress and the President.
23. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 10.
24. See, e.g., FISHKIN, supra note 3, at 85–88 (discussing the nuances
behind consensual versus aggregative forms of deliberation and suggesting
deliberative polling as a sort of middle ground).
25. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 15; see also Seyla Benhabib,
Deliberative Rationality and Models of Democratic Legitimacy, 1 CONSTELLATIONS 26,
29 (1994) (“A mere aggregation of majority preferences could not claim legiti-
macy because the basis on which the preferences of the minority were dis-
counted could not be stated.”).
26. Elster, supra note 5, at 1, 6.
27. Id.
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II. THE COURTS AS EXEMPLIFYING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
The discussion so far has extended primarily to deliberative
democracy in theory.  The question of how deliberative democ-
racy operates in practice is significantly less well-developed in the
literature.28  When it comes to the courts, a number of theorists
have argued or assumed that the judiciary operates as a delibera-
tive institution, or, at the very least, as an institution more delib-
erative than its counterparts in the legislative and executive
branches.  This in turn has led many theorists to hold the courts
up as examples for other branches to follow.  After all, if the
courts embrace more fully the principles of deliberative democ-
racy, then their decision making ought to be more well reasoned
and citizens should feel more incorporated into the process.  In
addition, we would expect some additional legitimacy to attach
to judicial decision making.
The existing scholarship on the issue has, however, made
this assumption largely without delving deeply into either the
structure of the courts or into doctrinal considerations.  The end
result has been a persistent belief among many scholars that
judges deliberate more than they do, and that the judiciary fun-
damentally differs from the other branches of government in its
adherence to the tenets of deliberative democracy.  Political and
legal philosophers, in other words, have a tendency to trust in
the courts more than in other branches of government.
To be fair to these theorists, there are good reasons to
believe that the courts do indeed embrace the kind of delibera-
tion endorsed by deliberative democrats, and that judicial deci-
sion making is preferable to legislative or executive decision
making.  First, the composition and structure of the judiciary
lends itself well to deliberation.  The federal courts, for example,
employ a relatively small group of individuals.  The Supreme
Court has nine Justices, and each appellate court has between
seven (in the First Circuit) and twenty-nine (in the Ninth Cir-
28. An increasing number of empirical and experimental studies have,
however, examined deliberation in the context of “deliberative polling,” as well
as in small-government settings.  For more on deliberative polling see FISHKIN,
supra note 3; James S. Fishkin, Toward Deliberative Democracy: Experimenting with
an Ideal, in CITIZEN COMPETENCE AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 279, 279–90
(Stephen L. Elkin & Karol Edward Soltan eds., 1999).  For more on deliberative
democracy in a small-government setting see DESIGNING DELIBERATIVE DEMOC-
RACY: THE BRITISH COLUMBIA CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLY (Mark E. Warren & Hilary
Pearse eds., 2008); Simone Chambers, Deliberative Democratic Theory, 6 ANN. REV.
POL. SCI. 307 (2003).  But see Lynn M. Sanders, Against Deliberation, 25 POL.
THEORY 347 (1997), for a strong critique of the feasibility of deliberative democ-
racy in general, and in the context of jury deliberation in particular.
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cuit) active judges—a small number compared to the 435 mem-
bers of the House of Representatives, or even the hundred
members of the Senate.  Judges are, moreover, known to operate
with small staffs, and with minimal interruptions and scheduled
events.  Representatives and senators, on the other hand, employ
dozens of staff members to handle legislative drafting and inter-
office communication.  Contrasted with their congressional
counterparts, we would naturally expect judges to engage in
more intimate deliberation; after all, deliberation is easier if the
participants know and interact with each other on a regular basis
and especially if they are unencumbered by staff members, press
interviews, and political appearances.
In addition, although the federal judiciary as a whole oper-
ates as a strictly hierarchical system—the Supreme Court at the
top, appellate and trial courts below—each individual court
operates on an egalitarian basis.  The Supreme Court Justices, for
example, appear to treat each other as equals, and we have anec-
dotal evidence of long-standing friendships even among intellec-
tual adversaries.29  Judges sitting at the trial or appellate level
similarly seem to have collegial relationships.  Even chief judges
have approximately the same responsibilities as their non-chief
colleagues, and all voices count equally once any judge has been
assigned to a panel.  By contrast, Congress is undoubtedly a hier-
archical place.  Even though each vote counts equally once a bill
reaches the floor, few would label congressional procedure as a
back and forth of “free and equal individuals” given the power
wielded by senior committee members or by members well estab-
lished within their party’s hierarchy.
The courts also employ a variety of institutional mechanisms
that have a distinctively deliberative shine.  Oral arguments, for
example, actually mimic somewhat the back and forth of a delib-
erative discussion: each side has a chance to speak, and judges
are quick to question and probe the weaknesses of each view-
point.  Equally deliberative are the briefs submitted by litigants.
All briefs (including those submitted by the parties and by amici)
are publicly available, and adversaries have a chance to respond
explicitly to claims made by their opponents—a debate in written
form.  Other institutional mechanisms with deliberative charac-
teristics include the post-argument conferences that judges have
with each other, as well as the intra-chambers meetings between
29. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Justices Strike a Balance, USA TODAY, Dec. 26,
2007, at 1D (“The friendship of [Justices] Ginsburg and Scalia, unlike that of
any other pair of justices in recent times, has intrigued—and mystified—observ-
ers for nearly three decades.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\27-2\NDE201.txt unknown Seq: 10  9-MAY-13 12:05
312 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 27
judges and their law clerks.  Judges, quite simply, appear to delib-
erate a lot—with the litigating parties, with each other, and with
their staffs.30  As Judge Edwards warmly puts it, “judges have a
common interest, as members of the judiciary, in getting the law
right, and that, as a result, we are willing to listen, persuade, and
be persuaded, all in an atmosphere of civility and respect.”31
But by far the most important factor that gives the courts a
deliberative aura is the opinion that accompanies each decision.
Not only are opinions publicly available the instant they are filed
(satisfying to a significant extent Gutmann and Thompson’s
“accessibility” requirement) but, unlike, say, congressional repre-
sentatives, judges provide a lengthy written justification of a court
decision.  Unsurprisingly, then, legal theorists have focused spe-
cifically on the judicial opinion as the primary source of the
courts’ deliberative promise, and have identified this as the key
component distinguishing the courts from the legislative and
executive branches.  Rawls, for example, emphasized the deliber-
ative concept of “public reason,” and he consistently referred to
courts as “exemplars” of this public reason32 due to their rea-
soned justification:
30. On this general point, see Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore,
Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate
Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1964 (2009) (“Judges deliberate when they
raise questions during oral argument to alert their colleagues to their concerns.
Judges deliberate in conference and continue to deliberate after conference
when they raise issues uncovered in their research.  Judges deliberate when they
circulate draft opinions, receive their colleagues’ responses, and negotiate reso-
lutions to any differences.”).
31. Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making,
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1645 (2003).
32. To some extent, the concept of “public reason” is distinguishable
from the principles underlying deliberative democracy.  Rawls explained public
reason as being
the reason of equal citizens who, as a collective body, exercise final
political and coercive power over one another in enacting laws and in
amending their constitution. . . . This means that political values alone
are to settle such fundamental questions as: who has the right to vote,
or what religions are to be tolerated, or who is to be assured fair equal-
ity of opportunity, or to hold property.
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 214 (expanded ed. 2005).  See Benhabib,
supra note 21, at 67, 74–75, for a discussion of the distinctions between delibera-
tive democracy and Rawls’s “public reason.”  These include that (1) “Rawls
restricts the exercise of public reason to deliberation about a specific subject
matter,” (2) “public reason is best viewed not as a process of reasoning among
citizens but as a regulative principle imposing limits upon how individuals, insti-
tutions, and agencies ought to reason about public matters,” (3) “for Rawls the social
spaces within which public reason is exercised are also restricted.”
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[Public reason] applies . . . in a special way to the judiciary
and above all to a supreme court in a constitutional
democracy with judicial review.  This is because the justices
have to explain and justify their decisions as based on their
understanding of the constitution and relevant statutes
and precedents.  Since acts of the legislative and the execu-
tive need not be justified in this way, the court’s special
role makes it the exemplar of public reason.33
Importantly, Rawls believed that these opinions must discuss
in plain language the important moral principles central to
deliberative democracy:
The justices cannot, of course, invoke their own personal
morality, nor the ideals and virtues of morality generally.
Those they must view as irrelevant.  Equally, they cannot
invoke their or other people’s religious or philosophical
views.  Nor can they cite political values without restriction.
Rather, they must appeal to the political values they think
belong to the most reasonable understanding of the public
conception and its political values of justice and public
reason.34
To this extent, reasons provided must be more than simply a
collection of judges’ own personal opinions.  Neither should the
proffered justifications be based on a particular religion or an
idiosyncratic worldview.  Justifications reflected through judicial
opinions should be written in a way that people from all walks of
life can understand.
Rawls also argued that the influence of a written opinion
could actually extend beyond its four corners; in fact, the
“court’s role as exemplar of public reason has a[nother] aspect:
to give public reason vividness and vitality in the public
forum . . . .”35  For Rawls, a court achieves this effect through its
authoritative judgments on fundamental political questions.  It
fulfills this role when it clearly and effectively interprets the con-
stitution in a reasonable way; and when it fails to do this, as ours
often has, it stands at the center of a political controversy the
terms of the settlement of which are public values.36
For Rawls, then, the Supreme Court’s exemplary status is
rooted first and foremost in the public reasoning in which the
Justices engage.  But the Court’s status as a deliberative institu-
33. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY:
ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS 95 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997).
34. RAWLS, supra note 32, at 236.
35. John Rawls, supra note 33, at 93, 112.
36. RAWLS, supra note 32, at 236–39.
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tion is further buttressed by its ability to invigorate and galvanize
public discussion, even at times when the Court’s own reasoning
might itself fall short. Rawls is not alone in thinking that the
courts have a deliberative potential unmatched by other
branches of government.  In thinking about the institution of
judicial review, Dworkin places paramount importance on the
reasoning contained in the opinion.  He argues:
Judicial review insures that the most fundamental issues of
political morality will finally be set out and debated as
issues of principle and not political power alone, a transfor-
mation that cannot succeed, in any case not fully, within
the legislature itself. That is important beyond the impor-
tance of the actual decisions reached in courts so
charged.37
For Dworkin, then, the central importance of the Court lies
in its unique ability to confront issues on the basis of reasoned
deliberation rather than “political power alone.”38  To this
extent, the judiciary differs markedly from its legislative counter-
parts, which must enact decisions by wielding political power and
which simply cannot adequately debate matters of political
morality.  Indeed, Dworkin posits that “[j]udicial review is a dis-
tinctive feature of our political life, envied and increasingly cop-
ied elsewhere. It is a pervasive feature, because it forces political
debate to include argument over principle, not only when a case
comes to the Court but also long before and long after.”39
Eisgruber, like Rawls and Dworkin, argues that the judiciary
is fundamentally different from the legislature.  His focus is, how-
ever, on the fact that legislators are elected officials, whereas
judges—at least those at the federal level—are not.  This, Eis-
gruber contends, is the key difference that allows judges to base
their decisions on principled reasoning:
Judges are supposed to respond to reasons, not prefer-
ences.  The structure of federal judicial institutions, and
especially of the Supreme Court, makes it likely that judges
will be disinterested and hence capable of acting on the
basis of reasons rather than interests. Legislators, by con-
trast, are supposed to respond to preferences as well as rea-
sons.  The need to stand for reelection guarantees that
they will be sensitive to preferences.  As a result, analyzing
Supreme Court decisions depends upon assessing the quality of
37. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 70 (1985).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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reasons, whereas analyzing political decisions often
amounts to counting heads.40
Though rooted in an electoral justification, Eisgruber’s posi-
tion dovetails with those of Rawls and Dworkin: what distin-
guishes the judiciary from other branches is the judicial opinion,
which engages seriously with publicly held moral principles.
Where Eisgruber extends the argument is in positing that it is the
unelected nature of judicial officers that allows them to put forth
these kinds of reasoned justifications.  It is because judges are
free from the burden of voter preferences that they are free to
engage in principled reasoning.  Elected representatives, by con-
trast, must pander to their political constituents, thus lowering
the bar for reasoned discussion to press releases and quid pro quo
bargaining.41
III. JUDICIAL DELIBERATION IN PRACTICE
We have so far seen that deliberative democracy brings with
it powerful intrinsic and instrumental benefits—among these
better decision making, a more involved citizenry, and, perhaps,
increased institutional legitimacy.  We have also seen that many
legal theorists believe that the courts—more than other political
branches—best epitomize the promise behind deliberative
democracy.  But do courts actually behave this way?  Do judges
behave differently from legislators or executives?  Are the reasons
provided by judges in their opinions the kind of reasons that we
would consider adequate justifications for purposes of delibera-
tive democracy?  The descriptive inquiry about these questions
can be divided into two areas: political (or procedural) and legal
(or substantive).  Political issues concern the institutional mecha-
nisms at the court—specifically whether we actually believe that
the institutional framework of the judiciary facilitates the kind of
40. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 98
(2001) (emphasis added).
41. It is important to note that thinking about the courts as inherently
deliberative bodies provides a thoughtful rejoinder to the counter-majoritarian
critique.  After all, assuming that courts do satisfy the deliberative tenets more
so than the other branches—a point on which Rawls, Dworkin, and Eisgruber
(and perhaps Elster, Cohen, and Gutmann and Thompson) would likely
agree—then their role in American democracy is normatively desirable.  Why?
The courts legitimize their own existence—and resolve to some extent their
“difficult” counter-majoritarian nature—by employing a different type of deci-
sion making, one that is actually better, more inclusive, and more transforma-
tive than those of other branches. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER F. ZURN, DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (2007); see also Christo-
pher F. Zurn, Deliberative Democracy & Constitutional Review, 21 LAW & PHIL. 467
(2002).
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deliberation required.  Legal issues, on the other hand, concern
the justification proffered by the Court—i.e., this inquiry takes
the opinions issued by judges at face value and moves forward by
analyzing these opinions.
A. Political (Procedural) Issues
Prior thinking into the deliberation of the courts has, as Gut-
mann and Thompson have argued, relied on a sort of “deductive
institutionalism.”42  This logic assumes that because judges pro-
duce crafted opinions that appear to rely on thoughtful justifica-
tion, reasoned deliberation led to that decision.  Of course, no
one would assume the same thing of legislators, who are assumed
beholden to their constituents.  “[But] [b]ecause of the incen-
tives built into the judicial role (such as the need for professional
respect), judges [are assumed to] have more regard for well-rea-
soned principles that are capable of discounting morally suspect
preferences.”43  Reasoning backwards from the opinion there-
fore has the effect of ignoring the incentives that the judges
themselves have, and it ignores any possible ulterior motives,
deeply held beliefs, or immutable personal characteristics that
they might possess.  A better inquiry into judicial deliberation
would employ forward, not backwards, induction, and it is here
that social science research sheds some clarity.
Using “forward induction,” the judicial process starts shed-
ding some of its deliberative patina from the moment of nomina-
tion.  One of the tenets of deliberative democracy is the
participation of individuals with free and open minds—ready to
engage with, and be accommodating to, opposing viewpoints.
But there is strong evidence that Presidents do not appoint
judges for their ability to engage in nuanced deliberation;
neither do Presidents appoint judges based on their willingness
to consider conflicting viewpoints.  Indeed, the prevailing view is
that Presidents select nominees largely on the basis of like-
minded—and somewhat fixed—political ideology.44  Scholarship
on the Supreme Court, for example, suggests that Presidents
appoint judges who not only share their opinion but also tend to
42. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 45.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology and the Selection of Federal Judges,
36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 619, 624–26 (2003) (“No one seems to deny that it is
completely appropriate for the President to consider ideology in making
appointments.  Presidents, of course, always have done so.”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN
ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
6 (2006) (“In the modern era, at least, presidents are usually interested in
ensuring that judicial appointees are of a certain stripe.”).
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vote exclusively in accord with their positions.45  Take, for exam-
ple, the recent nominations to the Court—John Roberts, Samuel
Alito, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan.  With the exception of
Kagan, all have long, well-developed records of their ideological
profiles.  Justice Alito, for example, as an applicant to a federal
government position, wrote early in his career that he always has
“been a conservative and an adherent to the same philosophical
views that I believe are central to [the Reagan] Administra-
tion.”46  He continued in the same essay:
I believe very strongly in limited government, federalism,
free enterprise, and the supremacy of the elected branches
of government, responsible to the electorate . . . .  Most
recently, it has been an honor and source of personal satis-
faction for me to serve . . . President Reagan’s administra-
tion and to help advance legal positions in which I
personally believe very strongly.  I am particularly proud of
my contributions in recent cases in which the government
has argued in the Supreme Court that racial and ethnic
quotas should not be allowed and that the Constitution
does not protect a right to an abortion.47
Little in Alito’s application suggests a willingness to engage
seriously with viewpoints in favor of abortion rights, affirmative
action, or a welfare state.  To the contrary, this document dis-
plays a certain amount of recalcitrance toward, and perhaps hos-
tility to, opposing viewpoints, and Alito admits to taking
“personal satisfaction” in defeats sustained by abortion advocates
and affirmative action supporters.48  Justices can indeed change
their minds,49 but Alito’s statement purposefully signals adher-
ence to a particular worldview50 and his record on the Court—
45. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., The Increasing Importance of Ideology in the
Nomination and Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 609, 610,
620 (2008) (employing statistical analysis and finding that “the ideology of the
Presidents and their nominees is rather closely associated” and that the impor-
tance of ideology in appointments “seems to be increasing with time”).
46. Samuel A. Alito, Assistant Attorney General Application (Nov. 15,




49. Indeed, several Justices—among them Earl Warren, Harry Blackmun,
and, more recently, David Souter—have surprised appointing Presidents by
adopting new ideologies. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY ALLAN SEGAL, ADVICE
AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 119–20 (2005).
50. An admittedly partisan viewpoint is provided by Harry Reid, State-
ment on Confirmation of Samuel Alito (Jan. 31, 2006) (“I do not oppose the
Alito nomination on the basis of a 20-year-old job application.  Instead, I view
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along with those of Roberts and Sotomayor—has so far borne
out the expectations of his appointing President.
This is not to say that nominations such as these are inappro-
priate—nor is it to say that Alito should be faulted for having or
sharing strong views.  Judges, like legislators or executives, are
strong-willed, opinionated individuals, and it would be natural to
expect that strongly held political views are precisely what led
them to a career in public service.51  Similarly, Presidents would
be silly not to appoint those individuals most likely to implement
their long-term ideological agendas.  The problem does not lie in
Presidents appointing judges with strong, fixed opinions; the
problem lies in the expectation that judges ought to somehow be
different than Congressmen or Presidents and that they should
be somehow more willing to seriously entertain positions that
they have for years steadfastly opposed.  Unfortunately, delibera-
tive democracy does require participants to be willing to engage
seriously with opposing viewpoints, and this contrasts markedly
with what is seen in practice.  This aspect also raises questions
about deliberative democracy’s ability to work in a context where
partisan players remain the main participants.
There are, moreover, other institutional constraints specific
to the courts that should concern deliberative theorists.  Deliber-
ative democrats take seriously the notion that decision-making
processes should be open and visible to the public.  Trans-
parency, incorporation, and accessibility are elements key to any
deliberative enterprise.  Judged by these standards, decision mak-
ing in the courts is rarely transparent, inclusive, or accessible—
especially when compared to congressional or executive decision
making.  The most public of judges, Supreme Court Justices, in
all instances keep low profiles and make few public appear-
ances—a fact that contrasts significantly with their more political
peers.52  Those appearances that Justices do make are generally
that document as a roadmap to Judge Alito’s subsequent judicial opinions and
speeches.  Judge Alito’s judicial opinions have been largely consistent with the
ideological signals he sent in the 1985 job application . . . .”).
51. Alito, supra note 46 (“In college . . . I discovered the writings of Alex-
ander Bickel advocating judicial restraint, and it was largely for this reason that
I decided to go to Yale Law School.”).
52. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, How to Open Up Our Court, USA TODAY, Apr. 23,
2008, at 11A (“[W]e see a lot of the justices when they are nominated and again
when they leave the court.  But in between, when they are doing the public’s
business, they drop out of sight—unless they have a book to sell.”); Fernanda
Santos, Who’s That Guy? Without Robes, Grand Marshal Is Mystery, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
11, 2005, at B3 (“Despite Justice Scalia’s prominence, few paradegoers recog-
nized him, a reflection perhaps of Supreme Court justices’ long tradition of
limiting their public appearances.”).
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at elite institutions—mostly at top-flight law schools—and on top-
ics of general interest (e.g., career forums or moot courts), not
specifically on the moral questions before the Court.  Members
of the media are often barred or closely monitored.53  To be fair
to the Justices, there is a logic to this privacy.  Judges are natu-
rally loath to appear biased, lest they be called upon to recuse
themselves at a later point, a concern that seldom troubles legis-
lators.  And quite a few of them are simply shy and prefer to be
left alone to their work.54  While these choices are understanda-
ble—rational, even, from the judges’ standpoint—they under-
mine the principles of deliberative democracy, which demand
transparency, incorporation, and accessibility in the decision-
making process.
The inaccessible nature of the courts extends directly into
their handling of cases.  Oral arguments in the nation’s federal
courts have never been recorded or televised, and no photogra-
phy is allowed.55  The limited seating available in the Supreme
Court courtroom is generally reserved for the parties and their
lawyers, for members of the Supreme Court Bar, and for select
members of the press.  Only a fraction of seats is made available
for public seating, and those who want to witness the Court in
action are admitted on a first come, first served basis.  If the case
being heard is particularly newsworthy, members of the public
must queue up hours, even days, before the Supreme Court
begins its session.56
53. For a comical take, see Adam Liptak, You Can Quote Me, Next Week,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2009, at A1 (reporting on Justice Kennedy’s visit to a local
school and noting that Kennedy’s office “insisted on approving any article” writ-
ten about the visit by the school’s newspaper staff).
54. See, e.g., Gina Holland, David Souter: The Justice Is Still a Mystery Man
After 14 Years in Capital, THE DAILY JEFFERSONIAN, May 5, 2004, http://daily-jeff.
com/local%20news/2004/05/06/david-souter-the-justice-is-still-a-mystery-man-
after-14-years-in-capital (quoting Justice Souter in a 1996 letter as saying that
“[i]n a perfect world, I would never give another speech, address, talk, lecture
or whatever as long as I live ”).
55. Former Senator Arlen Specter introduced several propositions that
would have forced the Supreme Court to televise proceedings, measures the
Justices have publicly opposed. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, A Renewed Call to Televise
High Court, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2007.  Public opinion appears situated solidly
against the Justices. See, e.g., New C-SPAN/Penn, Schoen and Berland Associates Poll:
What Americans Know About the U.S. Supreme Court and Want Changed About the
Court, C-SPAN (Sept. 24, 2009), available at http://supremecourt.c-span.org/
assets/pdf/CSPANSupremeCourtPollSept242009.pdf [hereinafter C-SPAN
Supreme Court Poll] (reporting that 65% of respondents agreed that “the U.S.
Supreme Court should allow television coverage of its oral arguments”).
56. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Tailgating Outside the Supreme Court, Without the
Cars, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2010, at A14 (chronicling the misadventures of people
waiting all night for a chance to see Supreme Court oral arguments and noting
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The normative implication here is that the Supreme Court
operates without attracting much public attention, and the pub-
lic as a consequence knows little about the Supreme Court and
its decision making.  A 2006 public opinion poll revealed that
77% of Americans could identify two out of the Seven Dwarfs in
Snow White, but only 24% of Americans could identify at least two
Supreme Court Justices,57 while another poll found that only 1%
could name all nine Justices.58  A more recent poll found that
only 49% of Americans could name any U.S. Supreme Court
case, with 84% of those individuals pointing to Roe v. Wade.59  By
contrast, only 9% of these individuals were able to identify Brown
v. Board of Education.60  This consistent lack of public knowledge
is masked by—and militated through—the fact that the public
“approves” of the Court more than it does of Congress.61  From a
deliberative perspective, however, “approval” is far less desirable
than incorporation.  Indeed, approval is important—and it no
doubt dovetails somewhat with a sense of legitimacy—but if the
approval stems from lack of familiarity, then it is meaningless
from a deliberative perspective.
Perhaps the most troubling from a deliberative perspective
is the fact that the norm of judicial privacy extends to inter-cham-
bers deliberation.  These conferences—where any reasoned dis-
cussion would take place, where conflicting viewpoints would be
debated, and where compromises would be reached—are strictly
off-limits to anyone but judges themselves.  Prevented by norms
of privacy from direct observation, recent scholarship has used
somewhat indirect methods in trying to unpack the underlying
that “the number of seats set aside for members of the public who want to see
entire arguments can be as few as 50” and that “[t]here is a separate line for
those interested in getting a three-minute glimpse”).
57. New National Poll Finds: More Americans Know Snow White’s Dwarfs Than
Supreme Court Judges, Homer Simpson Than Homer’s Odyssey, and Harry Potter Than
Tony Blair, BUSINESS WIRE (Aug. 14, 2006).  By contrast, 69% of respondents in a
separate 2007 poll could identify the U.S. Vice President, and another 66%
could identify their state’s governor. PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE
PRESS, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW 1989–2007 (2007), available at http://people-
press.org/reports/pdf/319.pdf.
58. Kimberly Atkins, Commentary: Anonymous Justices, LAWYERS USA, June
2, 2010, http://lawyersusaonline.com/dcdicta/2010/06/02/anonymous-
justices.
59. C-SPAN Supreme Court Poll, supra note 55.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., KARLYN H. BOWMAN & ANDREW RUGG, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR
PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, PUBLIC OPINION ON THE SUPREME COURT (2010), availa-
ble at http://www.aei.org/files/2010/06/28/BowmanPOSSupremeCourt.pdf.
Approval of the Supreme Court hovers between 50% and 60%, while support
for Congress generally hovers around 20% to 25%.
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mechanisms of judicial deliberation.  The preliminary conclu-
sion of this research is that, if anything, judicial decision making
might be more similar to legislative bargaining than to a truly
deliberative model.  Consider the decision-making rule used by
the Court: a simple majority vote where five out of nine judges is
enough to constitute a majority.  A longstanding principle in eco-
nomic and social choice theory is that these kinds of voting struc-
tures are driven by the existence (and importance) of a median
voter—the person with half of the other decision makers ideo-
logically to his/her “right” and half ideologically to his/her “left”
on a particular issue.62  The middle position allows the median
voter to have an inordinate amount of influence on the decision-
making process.  Although most frequently invoked in the litera-
ture on Congress and elections,63 this “Median Voter Theorem”
has increasingly been applied to judicial decision making by the
Supreme Court.64  From a legal or political science perspective,
the significance of the “median Justice” (like his median voter
counterpart) is that his position “will prevail under majority rule
and various voting procedures.”65  From a deliberative perspec-
tive, however, the significance of the “median Justice” is that it
analogizes the Court to a legislative body where one member
holds unique (if not absolute) power by virtue of his or her cen-
tral position on an ideological spectrum.66  The end result, quite
62. This idea is called the “Median Voter Theorem.” See, e.g., Duncan
Black, On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making, 56 J. POL. ECON. 23 (1948); see
also ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).
63. For applications of the Median Voter Theorem in the congressional
context see Black, supra note 62, at 23–24; Keith T. Poole & R. Steven Daniels,
Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959–1980, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
373 (1985).  For applications of the Median Voter Theorem in the context of
elections see DOWNS, supra note 62.
64. Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median Justice on the United States Supreme
Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275 (2005); Bernard Grofman & Timothy J. Brazill, Iden-
tifying the Median Justice on the Supreme Court Through Multidimensional Scaling:
Analysis of “Natural Courts” 1953–1991, 112 PUB. CHOICE 55 (2002); see also
Byron J. Moraski & Charles R. Shipan, The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A
Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 4 (1999); Lee
Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37 (2008).
65. Martin et al., supra note 64, at 1281.  Martin et al. find that the iden-
tity of the median Justice fluctuates over time and that this fluctuation repre-
sents a coherent ideological portrait of any given natural court.
66. The coverage on this is voluminous. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Justice
Kennedy: The Highly Influential Man in the Middle, WASH. POST, May 13, 2007, at
A01 (“[Justice] Kennedy holds enormous power in pivoting between the left
and right, legal experts say.  He stands alone in the middle—and that enhances
his importance.”); Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court
Moved Right, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, at A2 (“The [Court’s recent rulings]
underscore what case after case demonstrated as the term unfolded: Justice
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naturally, is that the median Justice becomes the target of bar-
gaining, lobbying, and cajoling efforts.  Litigants have accord-
ingly directed their arguments toward the current median,
Justice Kennedy,67 and we must also assume that the other Jus-
tices do the same once in chambers.
The mathematical existence of a median Justice brings to
the forefront the role that very un-deliberative (i.e., strategic) tac-
tics can play in practice.  On this point, Epstein and Knight’s
analysis of Supreme Court decision making provides a good illus-
tration.68  Their empirical (and historical) analysis presents the
Justices as political actors, strategically leveraging their votes to
further their own interests—more akin to legislators bargaining
amongst themselves, and less like the deliberative democrats that
we might imagine.  How does this kind of bargaining take place?
First, the Justices generally communicate between, not among,
themselves—i.e., memos are circulated privately, between the
individual Justices and the presumptive writing Justice, and not
to the entire Court.  And, second, the memos themselves
represent a straightforward quid pro quo bargain: the Justice writ-
ing the memo is doing so to bring attention to language that is
preventing him or her from joining in the opinion.  This kind of
bargaining—where one party threatens to withhold a vote unless
certain specific changes are made—bears a surprisingly strong
resemblance to what happens in Congress, and the evidence on
this point is startling: “[I]n more than two-thirds of the most
important cases of the 1970s and 1980s, at least one justice
attempted to bargain with the opinion writer—with a good deal
of the negotiation done through private memos.”69  This phe-
nomenon has become widespread: “Of nine landmark cases
Kennedy’s role in the position that Justice Sandra Day O’Connor once held at
the [C]ourt’s center of gravity.”).
67. See, e.g., Kevin T. McGuire et al., Targeting the Median Justice: A Con-
tent Analysis of Legal Arguments and Judicial Opinions (May 24, 2009) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (finding that litigants are more likely to include arguments
that appeal to the median Justice); see also Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties
Union, Supreme Court Ends Term by Striking Down Military Tribunals at
Guantanamo Bay: Justice Kennedy Emerges As Critical Swing Vote on the Rob-
erts Court (June 29, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/national-security/
supreme-court-ends-term-striking-down-military-tribunals-guantanamo-bay
(quoting ACLU national legal director Steven R. Shapiro in saying “the votes
[by Justices Roberts and Alito] may be less important on a range of critical
issues than Justice Kennedy, who now holds the balance of power on a closely
divided Court”).
68. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998).
69. Id. at 73 (emphasis added).  For example, one memo from Justice
Rehnquist to Justices Burger, Powell, and O’Connor reads: “I have been negoti-
ating with John Stevens for considerable time in order to produce a fifth vote in
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handed down during the first term of the Rehnquist Court, eight
generated at least one bargaining statement.”70  In addition, “in
several of those, the opinion writer was confronted with the task
of negotiating with more than one justice at the same time.”71
What this correspondence suggests, then, is that the Justices
engage in serious bargaining behind closed doors and that this
bargaining is closer to a simple zero-sum, quid pro quo bargaining
than to the kind of nuanced give-and-take that forms the back-
bone of true deliberation.  Justices, it appears, behave more like
congressional representatives trading votes over a bill rather than
the transformed deliberators many would hope them to be.
B. Substantive (Doctrinal) Issues
We are still left to ponder the fact that judges frequently
issue nuanced opinions, and that these decisions could reflect
the kind of reasoning expected from a deliberative regime.  On
this point, we can infer from these thoughtful opinions that
either true deliberation is taking place in judicial chambers, or
move forward admitting that the process might not be as deliber-
ative as we had originally hoped, but that the end result is, quite
happily, deliberative.72  The reasons outlined above make the
first assumption somewhat difficult to swallow.  But the second
consideration is interesting in its own right.  Some of the benefits
of deliberative democracy could still attach from having a deci-
sion grounded in a strong and nuanced discussion of moral prin-
ciples.  And accepting that the opinions themselves reflect some
reasoned deliberation would allow the courts to retain some of
the deliberative promise envisioned by Rawls, Dworkin, and
others.
my Bildisco opinion.  I have agreed to make the following changes in the cur-
rently circulating draft, and he has agreed to join if I do.” Id. at 74.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. On the specific consequences of court opinions, this Essay is fairly
agnostic.  Some have posited that the courts are defenders of those very things
that facilitate deliberation more broadly and, thus, sole focus on whether the
courts are deliberative is by itself misguided. See generally Corey Brettschneider,
Balancing Procedures and Outcomes Within Democratic Theory: Core Values and Judi-
cial Review, 53 POL. STUD. 423, 439 (2005) (“Although political scientists and
political theorists have often defined democracy in terms of institutions and
procedures, my own view suggests why it is impossible to understand democ-
racy’s value independent of specific policy controversies.”).  Although courts’
decisions are no doubt important, a complication of this viewpoint is that we
have no way to assess how much the courts’ decisions would change if the judi-
cial process was more deliberative.
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This discussion implies, obviously, that we should pay close
attention to the nature of judicial opinions, taking at face value
the reasoning they contain.  To this extent, judicial opinions
need to have both accessible language and accessible content.
After all, “deliberative justification does not even get started if
those to whom it is addressed cannot understand its essential
content.”73  On this point, however, few would dispute that the
judiciary stumbles with alarming frequency.  Reporters are rife
with gummy opinions whose substance is obscured by a variety of
prongs, rules, exceptions, standards, and procedural issues,
topped with the occasional dollop of Latin.  Sentences are at
times so thickly punctuated with citations that ascertaining points
and arguments can be difficult, and even relatively straightfor-
ward opinions are frequently prefaced by dense procedural dis-
cussions that add little to the moral considerations involved.74
From a deliberative perspective, this leaves open the key question
of to whom opinions are addressed.  The public?  Litigants?
Lower courts?  The answer, like the opinions themselves, is
unclear.75
Let us assume for the sake of discussion that cases are written
lucidly and clearly.  It is then the second requirement—that the
substantive contents of any opinion reflect reasoned delibera-
tion—that presents a stumbling block.  As Zurn and others have
observed,76 judicial opinions—both at the Supreme Court and
lower court levels—are in some instances extremely narrow in
their reasoning and focus on minor technicalities rather than sig-
nificant moral dimensions.  And judicial obsession with a case’s
procedural posture makes it so that judges can frequently avoid
questions of general concern or moral principles, opting instead
for easier, quicker, technical answers that will attract less atten-
tion.  In this regard, there are dozens of examples, a recent
instance being Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow.77  The
issue in that case involved the constitutionality of the Pledge of
73. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 4.
74. Christopher Zurn has, for example, done a case-by-case analysis of
several important Supreme Court opinions, trying to discern whether the lan-
guage employed by the Court is one of generally understood moral principles
—as opposed to more narrowly construed holdings based on legal technicali-
ties.  His conclusion is that the Justices for the most part “are rightly engrossed
with the technicalia of the rule of law, not with arguments about fundamental
moral and political principles.” ZURN, supra note 41, at 188.
75. No systematic study (to the author’s knowledge) has looked at the
public’s ability to comprehend or analytically synthesize the content of contem-
porary Supreme Court opinions.
76. See ZURN, supra note 41, at 184–220.
77. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
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Allegiance under the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.
As the case involved religion, public life, and parental rights,
Newdow represented precisely the kind of situation where a
broadly written opinion—one seriously engaged with moral prin-
ciples and written with a public audience in mind—would have
been particularly appropriate.  What happened was actually quite
different.  The Court’s well-publicized opinion dodged the con-
stitutional questions at the heart of the case, instead reversing
the appellate court’s decision on the ground that the plaintiff, a
non-custodial parent, lacked the necessary legal standing to pro-
ceed with his case.  The end result, as many bitterly observed, is
that the Court avoided any discussion of the important moral
principles underlying the arguments and, “after agreeing to carry
out its democratic tasks of exemplifying, representing, or com-
municating in the people’s moral-political reason, the Court
switched to its preferred legalistic language and found a way of
shirking its civic duties.”78
An obvious counter is that the Court’s hand was forced—
had it decided the case on the basis of the substantive issues
involved, it might have made a glaring legal mistake in handling
the plaintiff’s non-custodial status (i.e., his standing to seek
relief).  To that extent, the Court would have exposed itself to
legitimate attacks from elites within the legal community—per-
haps future judges or Justices, law professors, or practitioners.
This argument is fair: no one, not even Supreme Court Jus-
tices, wants to leave themselves open to an attack further down
the road, and no one wants to look bad in the eyes of their peers.
But acting rationally does not shake the deliberative critique, and
by structuring the opinion in a manner that so blatantly avoided
the constitutional question, the Court effectively postponed the
resolution of the issue to a later time—and in so doing left a
palpable void in public discourse.  Does the Pledge of Allegiance
violate the First Amendment?  Should children have to voice
their moral allegiance to a country “under God”?  What are the
considerations on both sides of that debate?  These are exactly
the kinds of questions that deliberative democracy demands be
addressed by transparent, reasoned decision making.
Along with the political question doctrine and the doctrine
of constitutional avoidance, doctrines like standing are one way
that courts can dodge difficult questions using the cloak of legal
propriety.  But it could be there is a simpler, perhaps more con-
troversial, mechanism at work here: basic reliance on legal prece-
dent and prior case law.  Of course, there are many good reasons
78. ZURN, supra note 41, at 188.
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for the courts’ historical reliance on precedent: having a consis-
tent legal framework for non-legal actors to follow, creating a
permanent body of law for all judges to apply, etc.  No one can
dispute these public policy considerations.  But stepping outside
of this schema, and viewing the system from a deliberative frame-
work, having a large body of precedent allows judges to avoid
addressing difficult moral questions in a comprehensive fashion.
Rather than having to explain each important holding on the
basis of moral principles, judges in many instances can simply
apply or distinguish prior cases on point—a significantly easier
task.  Previous case law is decided on the basis of even older pre-
cedent, linking cases back to each other in a kind of circular
logic—a logic where morally grounded reasoning is neither
required nor particularly welcome.  Some areas of Anglo-Ameri-
can common law, established originally by cases that once did
employ reasoned deliberation, have been reduced to the quick
application of somewhat obscure and occasionally illogical rules
and doctrines (e.g., the rule against perpetuities) that even
trained lawyers have difficulty explaining.  Going back to the
example in Newdow, at some point a nuanced, carefully consid-
ered explanation emerged as support for the standing doctrine.
But its harsh application to the Newdow facts—effectively shutting
down reasoned debate on the real issues involved—severed the
connection between standing and its justification.  No longer
grounded by a thoughtful debate about the appropriate role of
the courts, standing is now simply understood as a tool often
used by the courts to avoid tough constitutional questions.
This is indeed a bold assertion: after all, reliance on prece-
dent forms the bedrock of the Anglo-American legal system.  To
that end, let us step back from the ledge for a moment and admit
two key facts.  First, reliance on precedent is obviously an impor-
tant institutional mechanism, and a precedent-free system would
quickly devolve into an inconsistent patchwork of case law,
strongly undermining the predictability of laws and legal enforce-
ment.  We might want judges to decide each case on the basis of
moral principles, but it would result in an intractable, unpredict-
able mess, both for judges and for litigants.  Second, and perhaps
more importantly, not all precedent serves to constrain the par-
ticipation of the courts in contemporary moral debates.  Since
the 1940s, vast areas of case law have expanded the courts’ reach
into publicly salient topics, and many would argue that, if any-
thing, the courts have vastly increased the range of important
issues that they participate in.  A case in point—and certainly the
most controversial of doctrinal expansions—is the idea of sub-
stantive due process, under which individual citizens are
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accorded certain inalienable rights (among these the right to
raise one’s children according to the dictates of one’s con-
science,79 the right to marry,80 the right to make end-of-life deci-
sions,81 and the right to privacy in intimate relationships82) that
are unmentioned, but nonetheless constitutionally protected.
For the purposes of this discussion, the public nature of these
“fundamental” rights, their salience in contemporary public dia-
logue, and their importance in citizens’ day-to-day lives means
that this is a prime area for the courts to engage in the kind of
public reasoning required by deliberative democracy.  After all,
the public understands with agonizing clarity what it means to be
denied privacy in their sexual and reproductive lives, and they
understand what it means to not be able to marry the person
they love.
The Court’s gay-rights jurisprudence is a good example.
The rise of the LGBT movement, the debate over same-sex mar-
riage, and the increasing prominence of gays and lesbians in
politics, finance, and the media have made the public discussion
of gay and lesbian rights imperative; and the Court has (again, to
its credit) not shied away.  But—and this is a key point—does the
deliberation on display in these cases meet deliberative democ-
racy’s standards?  Consider Bowers v. Hardwick, which upheld a
controversial anti-sodomy statute and was a blow to gay and les-
bian rights.83  The primary motivation behind the majority opin-
ion was that the “constitutional right of homosexuals to engage
in acts of sodomy” was neither rooted in American “history and
tradition” nor “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”84
Indeed, for Justice White, it was clear that
[p]roscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots.
Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and was for-
bidden by the laws of the original thirteen States when they
ratified the Bill of Rights. . . . Against this background, to
claim that a right to engage in such conduct is “deeply
79. E.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
80. E.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
81. E.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Cruzan v. Mo.
Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
82. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497 (1961).
83. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
84. Id. at 191–95.
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rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” or “implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty” is, at best, facetious.85
The precedent on Justice White’s point is quite clear.  To be
recognized as a fundamental right for purposes of the Due Pro-
cess Clause, any presumptive rights or liberties (including the
right to “homosexual sodomy”) must be “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition”86 or “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist
if they were sacrificed.”87  So, for the Bowers majority, that a
group (gays and lesbians, in this case) had long been denied cer-
tain rights was reason enough for the denial to continue.
Leaving aside the implications of the opinion, substantive
due process cases like Bowers illustrate two intertwined delibera-
tive critiques.  First, even commendable attempts to address con-
temporary moral debates—for example, case law in the
substantive due process tradition—tend to operate on a strongly
path-dependent basis, one governed in large part by what has
happened before.  What is a fundamental right?  Again, accord-
ing to the Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence, a fun-
damental right is one that is deeply rooted in this nation’s
“history and tradition.”  From a purely descriptive perspective,
rights that are deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition
are by nature those that already enjoy some measure of protection
under laws and legal precedent.  And from a normative delibera-
tive perspective, the path dependence generated by looking only
to “history and tradition” effectively allows the Court to sidestep
contemporary debates by permitting Justices to leverage sheer
inertia to reach legal conclusions—much like reliance on prece-
dent permits the courts to evade important constitutional issues.
The end results are opinions that consistently fail in capturing
contemporary public debates.
This first critique dovetails with a second deliberative cri-
tique, which is that it remains unclear just how the discussions in
cases like Bowers (and also its successor, Lawrence v. Texas)88 illu-
minate or reflect current moral discourse. Bowers cited historical
laws and customs unfavorable to gays and lesbians—an obvious
instance of confirmation bias (e.g., “cherry picking”).89  Confir-
85. Id. at 192–94.
86. Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
87. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937).
88. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
89. Commentary on this point is well-developed. See, e.g., William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Sodomy and Guns: Tradition as Democratic Deliberation and Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 193 (2009); John C. Toro, The
Charade of Tradition-Based Substantive Due Process, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 172, 194
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\27-2\NDE201.txt unknown Seq: 27  9-MAY-13 12:05
2013] COURTING DELIBERATION 329
mation bias works both ways, and Bowers’ successor, Lawrence, was
guilty of the same thing—pointing to existing laws and practices
favorable to gays and lesbians in its overruling of Bowers.  The
problem with this kind of decision making is not only that it fails
in capturing the public debate, but also that it allows the courts
to effectuate deeply held views about the morality of homosexu-
ality through the lens of ostensibly reasoned justification.  This
aspect highlights a key norm of contemporary judicial thinking:
judges are not “supposed” to have opinions; they are simply “sup-
posed” to interpret.  The unfortunate outcome is, however, that
most people (especially public officials) have deeply held opinions
on these issues; forcing judges to invoke precedent, history, or
tradition to support these prior beliefs merely drives the discus-
sion away from moral principles that citizens can understand and
toward the generalization of prior laws and legal precedent on
the basis of one’s prior personal beliefs.  Ironically, this is
removed from Rawls’ insistence that the Supreme Court Justices
“cannot . . . invoke their own personal morality, nor the ideals
and virtues of morality generally” or “cite political values without
restriction.”90
IV. FURTHER THOUGHTS & CONCLUSIONS
Where does this discussion leave us?  Are the courts hope-
lessly un-deliberative?  Maybe.  For the courts to realize their
deliberative potential outlined by Rawls and Dworkin, the judici-
ary would have to undergo significant, perhaps unwelcome,
changes.  True deliberation requires transparent deliberation.
Oral arguments would have to be televised in real time and
closely analyzed, debated, and discussed in public forums.
Judges’ correspondences regarding cases would also have to be
made publicly available, if not while the proceedings are happen-
ing, then certainly following the filing of the opinion.  And
judges themselves would have to be more publicly accessible and
more available to interact with the public on issues at the heart of
public debate.  Accountability and dynamism—including the
willingness of participants to engage with members of the public
with regard to issues before the courts—are important attributes
of the deliberative framework and cannot be denied.
(2009) (“[T]he deep roots test does a poor job of eliminating moral-political
judgments from the substantive due process framework because judges are free
to ‘cherry-pick’ from history to support their preconceived opinions [and]
judges have discretion in characterizing the relevant tradition . . . .”).
90. RAWLS, supra note 32, at 236.
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Other necessary changes might, however, be even more dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to enact.  Deliberation at its bare mini-
mum requires that participants enter the process with an open
mind, ready and willing to consider seriously the merits of oppos-
ing viewpoints.  Unhappily, judges today are appointed (or
elected) largely on the basis of their ideological consistencies,
and the strategic impulses behind these strategic actions would
be impossible to change.  Presidents, understandably, want no
surprises, and they have every incentive to appoint individuals
who will predictably vote in one way, and one way only.  Execu-
tives appointing individuals who exercise independent thought
will reap no rewards, and there is even less of an incentive to
appoint jurists who entertain with any gravity opposing view-
points.  Changing this aspect of the judiciary, and of the confir-
mation process, would entail reforming at a fundamental level
the separation-of-powers structure establishing federal judiciary,
an all but impossible task.
In terms of deliberative substance (i.e., reasoned justifica-
tion), the nature of Supreme Court opinions, and the institution
of precedent, represents a second inexorable difficulty.  Do we
want to move away from a precedent-based legal system?  Would
we be at ease with a regime where judges engage in moral delib-
eration and address each case de novo?  If we were perfectly hon-
est with ourselves, the answer would probably be no.  To allow
judges the kind of power to address moral questions without the
constant invocation of existing laws and legal precedent would
undermine significantly the existing legal system, and adjudica-
tion would become significantly less predictable—both for liti-
gants and for the public.  Legal life would truly become snarled
and conflicted if we expected jurists to evaluate each case before
them solely on the basis of the moral considerations presented
therein.
The issues raised in this Essay ultimately leave us with two
implications.  First, deliberative democracy is undoubtedly very
appealing—bringing with it inherent benefits (transformed and
energized citizens) as well as instrumental benefits (better laws
and increased institutional legitimacy).  On the other hand, if
judicial deliberation falls short of the standard set by deliberative
democrats, then we should not be surprised if these benefits also
fail to materialize.  Accordingly, if we believe, as Gutmann,
Thompson, and Fishkin do, that deliberative democracy brings
with it a transformed and more sophisticated citizenry, then we
should not be surprised that only 24% of the public can name
two or more Supreme Court Justices and that only 1% can name
all nine.  Similarly, if we believe, like Benhabib and Rawls do,
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that reasoned deliberation brings with it increased legitimacy,
then we should not be surprised at the vitriolic rhetoric leveled
against “activist” judges and the “unelected” judiciary.  Neither
should we be surprised when the Supreme Court’s legitimacy is
called into question following cases like Bush v. Gore91 and
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.92
Second, the discussion suggests that deliberative democracy
at an institutional level might be an untenable ideal.  There are,
of course, opportunities for deliberative democracy to thrive in a
small government context, or within a deliberative polling exer-
cise,93 but as this Essay has argued, it is something else entirely to
think that deliberative democracy can operate at a national level.
To be sure, the more involved participants are in politics, and
the more they rise to a level of national prominence, then the
more inclined they will be to hold firm, fixed opinions—thus
making them less likely to be the kinds of individuals ideally situ-
ated to deliberate genuinely.  And for the judiciary specifically,
judges and lawyers are quite simply trained to argue on the basis
of precedent, not on the basis of widely understood moral princi-
ples.  Taken together, these considerations suggest that delibera-
tive democracy in the U.S. courts currently remains a normative
ideal, rather than as anything approaching a realized concept.
91. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
92. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
93. See Edwards, supra note 31.
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